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 ABSTRACT 
After a generation of non-professional writers in Islamic 
economics, professional economists entered the stage with 
an important ambition, which has been to introduce a third 
alternative to humanity in addition to capitalism and 
socialism that would answer some of the inadequacies of 
each. Moreover, the analysis of human (household and 
collective) behavior towards scarcity under the teachings of 
Islam was itself worth pursuing.  
The intellectual effort is yet to produce significant practices 
of Islamic economics. The exceptions include some 
application of Islamic finance that raises many questions, 
and spotty application of Zakah and Awqaf.  
The most serious challenges of Islamic finance is the rise of 
products of ill repute that result from determined refusal to 
adhere to the decisions of the International Fiqh Academy.  
This paper identifies several gaps in Islamic economics and 
proposes ways to fill them, placing such responsibility 
squarely on Islamic economists.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The ambitions of the economists who established the field 
of Islamic economics in the late seventies has been to 
introduce to humanity a new all-encompassing economic 
paradigm that gradually presents itself as an additional 
options in the choice of economic systems.  In addition, the 
analysis of human economic behavior under Shari'ah 
compliance would represent an academic curiosity that is 
in itself worth pursuing. 
Despite many daring steps towards application, Islamic 
economics is still to a large measure caged in books 
without being applied to real-life situations. The major 
exception is Islamic finance. In addition, some applications 
of Zakah and Awqaf can be found. 
Even in Islamic finance, the record of application does not 
have complete silver lining.  Products of ill repute that are 
prohibited by decisions of the International Fiqh Academy 
dominate the Islamic finance industry in some countries. 
Several gaps in Islamic economics need to be filled by both 
scholars and practitioners. When the count of such gaps 
started for the purpose of writing a keynote speech for a 
seminar sponsored by Aston and Dirham universities last 
month, it reached seven.  Now, it seems to be increasing.  
FIRST GAP: DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN 
ECONOMISTS AND SHARI'AH SCHOLARS 
An important reason for such dilemma is that there is 
some disagreement regarding the nature of Islamic 
economics. Such disagreement has arisen during the 
practices of Islamic finance.  Shari'ah scholars occupied a 
front seat in such implementation. Then, many acquired 
the impression in academic and professional circles that 
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Shari'ah scholars are “Islamic economists.” The media 
often introduces them as such.  Considering the time and 
effort involved in studying economics, we cannot imagine 
that Shari'ah scholars would instantly turn economists, 
once they supervised Islamic financial transactions.   
The involvement of Shari'ah scholars into Islamic finance 
afforded them the opportunity of rubbing shoulders with 
bankers.  A symbiotic relationship between both parties 
began.  Shari'ah scholars, while being accustomed in their 
profession to have modest earnings, found opportunities of 
high remuneration for their advisory services and bankers 
found that the seal of approval of Shari'ah scholars is 
worth a lot in the market.  This encouraged Shari'ah 
scholars to keep their posture as Islamic economists and to 
ignore economists themselves. 
In addition, Islamic finance has such a narrow scope in 
Islamic economics, yet it attracts disproportionate 
attention. The twelve Islamic finance and investment 
contracts can be quickly learnt by an economist. In 
addition, economists would have a comparative advantage 
over Shari'ah scholars in defining Maqassid Al-Shari'ah in 
the field of economics, which is something to which 
Shari'ah scholars pay little attention.   
Shari'ah scholars, as they are totally absorbed in assessing 
and insuring the formal validity of contracts, sometimes 
with total disregard to their consequences or Ma’alaat1. 
They seem to be satisfied with any contract, once they find 
a text in the old Fiqh literature in its support.  While they 
understand well the importance of Maqassid, they pay 
insufficient attention to them in practice.  
As example of this is the fact that the prohibition of Reba 
1 For example, the author estimates that Tawarruq products represent 80 percent in Saudi Arabia and 50 percent in 
the UAE.  Products based on debt sale dominate 60 percent of the total in Malaysia.  
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would automatically indicate that any transaction that 
boils down to exchanging spot for future money at a 
premium should be prohibited.  Yet few scholars insist that 
Tawarruq transactions are lawful, although their ultimate 
result is the trade of spot for future money at a premium. 
Economists in contrast are particularly trained in 
assessing the consequences of actions.  Their attention is 
always fixed towards ultimate consequences. To do 
otherwise would be contrary to the methodology of their 
discipline. 
The first gap we can find in Islamic economics is the 
encroachment of Shari'ah scholars on the field of 
economics, without being true to its methodology, nor 
being able to learn the basics that any economist worth 
his/her salt must know. 
We must therefore admit that Islamic economics is a 
branch of economics and not of Shari'ah, and Islamic 
finance is a branch of Islamic economics. Consequently, 
the tone of this discipline must be set by economists.   
Economists and Shari'ah scholars must therefore agree on 
the division of labor.  Shari'ah scholars can continue to do 
the job they know best, which is ascertaining formal 
validity of contracts, but the more important validity of 
purpose must be left to economists.  
SECOND GAP: THE ABSENCE OF AN ISLAMIC 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN REAL LIFE 
The second gap lies in the absence of a model of Islamic 
economics that is applied in the real world.  We can find 
countries with various political systems that raise the flag 
of Islamic economics.  Implementation, however, is limited 
to scattered applications, like some application of Zakah, 
Awqaf and Islamic finance with predominance of products 
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of ill repute, without a coherent common denominator 
between them.  
In contrast, there is one country that practices 
totalitarianism and military rule, but has made some 
modest advances in Islamic finance and macroeconomic 
policies. 
At the end, we notice that we do not have an economic 
system that approaches the application of the Islamic 
paradigm.  Compared to economists studying other 
systems, e.g., socialism and capitalism, Islamic economists 
find themselves at a big disadvantage. Undoubtedly, the 
presence of a socialist and a capitalist system has helped 
economists to introduce realistic and purposeful models for 
analysis which have later become a source of intellectual 
innovation. 
THIRD GAP: THE ABSENCE OF A GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
The third gap appeared when the paradigm of Islamic 
finance took a wrong detour from the very start. We 
concentrated on the prohibition of Reba or interest and 
how to provide finance in an interest-free environment.  An 
economist would notice that Islamic finance is based on the 
prohibition of trading present against future money, which 
means that money would have a time value only when 
traded against non-monetary commodities.  
This would require a more detailed general equilibrium 
model in which there is a market for trading each 
commodity, either spot, against deferred payment or with 
deferred delivery. Agios2 in such market, namely markups 
2 Traditionally an agio can be likened to the difference between the nominal and actual value of currency, and later 
to the commission taken by money changers to convert a currency into another. The word is used here to indicate 
differentials earned through the sale of goods or services.  
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and rentals would have difficulty finding a balance, 
because of the absence of an integrated debt market and 
the prohibition of debt trading. Arbitrage between, e.g., the 
wheat and the cotton markets for deferred payments and 
deferred delivery is not directly obvious and has not been 
considered theoretically.   
Add to this, the fact that we ignored the problem of term 
structure in such markets. Compared with conventional 
finance, such agios like, rates of return on Musharaka and 
Mudaraba, and fees on investment Wakala replace the rate 
of interest. Little has been said about whether their 
payment would have the same inefficiency effects that 
result from the substitution of real resources for money in 
transactions3. 
One of the reasons for such gap in our analysis lies in the 
way we began in the late seventies analyzing Islamic 
finance in a pure profit-sharing model. Somewhere along 
the way some of us forgot that pure models are tools of 
theoretical analysis rather than paradigms.  Some came up 
with attacks on sale finance, particularly Murabaha as not 
being consistent with profit and loss sharing. 
Another reason is that Islamic economists have mostly 
been students of the Anglo Saxon School of commercial 
banking. Very few of us came to learn about universal 
banking.  Being a model of pure financial intermediation 
between borrowers and lenders, commercial banking made 
the model of Islamic banking look rather impossible4. 
The detour has been long and bumpy calling for speedy 
correction. Our perception of the paradigm of Islamic 
finance requires refocusing on the absence of spot-against-
future money markets. This would lead to two inevitable 
3 Mabid Ali Al-Jarhi (1983) 
4 Mabid Ali Al-Jarhi (2003) 
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consequences. First, finance must be redefined to indicate 
the provision of required commodities through deferred 
payment, deferred delivery, sale of services and usufruct, 
partnership (in profit or product) or investment agency.  
Second, banking should be redefined to include investment 
and trading activities.  These two steps represent a good 
part of the revolution of Islamic economics against the 
received doctrine. 
FOURTH GAP: THE ROLE OF SHARI'AH BOARDS 
The fourth gap emanates from Islamic finance practices, 
which is the absolute requirement of Shari'ah boards in 
Islamic financial institutions. The function of Shari'ah 
boards is to structure Islamic financial products. This may 
have been necessary when Islamic finance was an infant 
industry. Now Islamic financial products are well defined. 
Most of them are considered lawful, Halal, by most 
Shari'ah scholars. Few are considered unlawful, which I 
prefer to call “products of ill repute,” that include 
Tawarruq, debt trading, 'Eina sale and risk-trading 
products5. Sadly enough, in some countries products of ill 
repute dominate the Islamic finance market. 
Placing the definitions of Islamic finance products into the 
banking and financial market laws would significantly 
reduce the need for Shari'ah boards and replace them 
gradually by legal experts with sufficient understanding of 
Shari'ah to apply such definitions6. 
FIFTH GAP: THE ABSENCE OF A UNIFIED AND 
WELL-DEFINED SHARI'AH METHODOLGY 
The fifth gap lies in the yet to be perfected methodology of 
5 Mabid Ali Al-Jarhi (2007). 
6 Mabid Ali Al-Jarhi (2012). 
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Shari'ah scholars. On the one hand, they accept 
theoretically that giving the validity of purpose in Islamic 
financial contracts must take precedence to formal validity. 
The ultimate consequence of contracts would therefore 
become the acid test for its validity. On the other hand, 
most of their judgments are based on formal validity. Such 
approach appears to be similar to partial in contrast to 
general equilibrium analysis in economics. 
This calls for a revolution in Fiqh Al-Muamalat. Since in 
such field, economics and Shari'ah disciplines have to be 
used together, Shari'ah methodology must be adjusted to 
give precedence to Maqassid, properly stated. Otherwise, 
Islamic finance will continue to be open to sharp 
differences, depending on whether scholars stress Maslaha, 
Sadd al-Altharai’e, different dosages of each, or ultimate 
Maqassid.  
Once the methodological gap has been filled, Shari'ah 
boards will seize to apply ingenious ruses to mimic 
conventional financial products carefully dressed in Islamic 
garb.  
SIXTH GAP: CENTRAL BANKS TREATMENT OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCE 
The sixth gap is related to the way central banks define 
their relationship with Islamic banks. Central banks 
generally ignore the differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks.  This raises two complications. One is 
that the investment activities of Islamic banks may escape 
legitimate scrutiny from central banks, which focus on 
financial soundness and pay little attention to investment-
related activities like feasibility studies and reviews. 
Central banks would not like to look into such 
technicalities as they are outside the competence of their 
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supervisory staff. 
Another possibility is that central banks, unaware of the 
true nature of Islamic banks, and unaccustomed to 
universal banking, may force Islamic banks into avoiding 
investment activities as being incommensurate with central 
banks perception of banking.  Islamic banks would 
substitute Shari'ah compliant products with other products 
that mimic conventional finance dressed in an Islamic 
garb. 
The other complication lies in the fact that central banks 
do not wish to involve themselves into Shari'ah matters.  
While they provide banks with licenses to work as “Islamic 
banks” that are supposed to have Shari'ah-compliant 
activities, they would not withdraw such licenses from 
banks violating them by supplying conventional financial 
products carefully dressed to appear as Shari'ah compliant. 
In the first instance, central banks must regulate and 
properly supervise Islamic banks’ investment activities. 
They should review investment procedures, feasibility 
studies and investment worthiness of Islamic banks’ use of 
funds. Limiting supervision to the financial review of 
Islamic banks is by no means sufficient. 
In the second instance, central banks must make their 
judgment about the Shari'ah compliance of Islamic banks, 
depending on their own methods and expertise and not just 
those of banks’ Shari'ah boards.  This can be done through 
external Shari'ah auditing, or simply applying the 
definitions of Islamic finance products mentioned in the 
banking and financial market laws to the actual products 
provided by banks. The reputation risk faced by Islamic 
banks has been rather serious and has not been fully 
eliminated by their Shari'ah boards. Such elimination 
would require extra actions from central banks. 
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Some central banks, together with some regional and 
financial institutions have established the Islamic Financial 
Services Board to develop regulatory and supervisory 
standards for Islamic banks and financial institutions.  The 
IFSB succeeded in issuing some standards, using 
customary procedures.  However, the differences between 
the ISFB standards and the conventional ones often seem 
to be marginal.  The IFSB seems to have avoided the 
difficult questions, especially those related to capital 
requirements and the governance of Shari'ah boards.  In 
addition, most central banks which are IFSB members do 
not adhere to its standards anyway.  
SEVENTH GAP: CENTRAL BANKS APPLICATION OF 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS TO ISLAMIC BANKS 
The seventh gap is the way central banks calculate capital 
requirements for risk and liquidity management in Islamic 
banks.  It is perfectly understandable to consider equity as 
a highly risky endeavor by conventional banks. Their 
liabilities are generally short term loans whose repayment 
is guaranteed (both principal and interest). Naturally, their 
assets must be equally short-term debt whose repayment is 
carefully guarded with collateral and other guarantees. 
Islamic banks, meanwhile, have liabilities drawn from 
shareholders’ funds and investment deposits. None of such 
liabilities is guaranteed debt, but rather profit sharing 
funds. The maturities of the funds can be extended 
through the proper introduction of restricted and long-term 
investment deposits.  
Equity finance itself is an investment that entitles the bank 
to continuous and inexpensive monitoring. It is therefore 
relatively free from information asymmetry and 
consequently protects banks from risks of adverse selection 
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and moral hazard.  In contrast to being a source of 
exposure to high risks in conventional banking, equity 
finance turns out to be an important risk metigant to 
Islamic banks. Therefore, central banks must stop 
penalizing Musharaka finance through heavy capital 
requirements. Instead, they should instruct Islamic banks 
to use Mudaraba finance solely with Musharaka. 
The application of Basle II AND Basle III to Islamic banks 
can be taken as an opportunity to reconsider a new 
definition of banking that combines universal banking with 
Islamic modes of finance.  The internal liquidity and risk 
management systems of such banks should be customized 
to suit their nature.  This can be an added challenge to the 
IFSB. 
EIGHTH GAP: FAULTY SUKUK 
The eighth gap is related to Islamic financial assets and 
Sukuk in particular. Sukuk are supposed to be Islamic 
financial assets that represent common undivided shares 
in Shari'ah-compliant real and financial assets. Sukuk 
therefore would be like shares in companies that represent 
equity investment.  However, Sukuk have been entrusted 
to the financial engineering talents of a group of Shari'ah 
scholars who view them not as Islamic financial 
instruments but are rather “Islamic bonds” or fixed income 
instruments that have cleverly been made up to look 
Shari'ah compliant.  Such perception can be traced back to 
the time when Islamic banks relied on British law firms in 
formulating contracts for international transactions, 
particularly syndicated finance. 
The global financial crisis has succeeded in washing out 
the thin Shari'ah compliance paint from several issues of 
Sukuk. Suddenly some Sukuk appeared to be pure 
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conventional loans indicating no title to any asset. The 
philosophy of Islamic financial engineering has been set 
from the beginning to issue bond-like instruments, paying 
no attention to the Islamic finance paradigm. Obviously, a 
revolution is urgently required to correct our thinking 
towards securitization in order to stop issuing titles to 
common shares in debt under the name of Sukuk. A lot of 
work is required in this regard.  AAOIFI has issued a new 
statement on Sukuk which added little in correcting the 
ongoing practices.  Perhaps the International Fiqh Academy 
should consider issuing its Sukuk standard to fill such 
gap.  The Academy has made a valuable contribution by 
recently by issuing one resolution on Sukuk in its 19th 
Meeting (Sharjah, 2009) and another one in its 20th 
Meeting (Algeria, 2012)7.  
NINTH GAP: THE HIATUS BETWEEN MONETARY 
POLICY AND ISLAMIC FINANCE. 
The ninth gap is the absence of any measurable link 
between monetary policy and Islamic finance. Financial 
instruments issued by monetary and financial authorities 
are mostly conventional. Changes in the monetary base or 
high-powered money largely depend on the debt money 
markets rather than the investment markets. 
The mere process of issuing money and the control of 
money supply in a conventional economy is debt-based.  
The central bank issues money in order to lend it to 
government and banks.  Islamic economics offer an 
alternative approach that ties issuing money with 
investment8.  Such approach is based on two pillars.  First, 
the central bank must attune monetary growth to economic 
growth, and not to the requirements of financing 
7 International Islamic Fiqh Academy (2009, 2012). 
8 Mabid Al-Jarhi (1983). 
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government budget deficit.  Second. All money issued must 
be invested through banks as investment deposits.  Profits 
would ultimately help in financing government budget. 
TENTH GAP: SHYNESS FROM USING MORAL 
VALUES 
Some Islamic economists may feel that their discipline is 
not value free, while economics is a positive science.  Being 
anxious to mimic physics, economists heavily use 
mathematics and statistics to develop and test their 
theories.  Along the way they forget that their unit of 
analysis is human.  Human qualities include believing and 
practicing certain moral values.  Homo Economicus in 
conventional economics is assumed to be a self-interested 
person, which may imply utility and wealth maximization.  
This is the most important moral judgment in economics, 
yet not sufficiently obvious to others. 
Islamic economists must therefore place economics in the 
right perspective.  It is a social science whose unit of 
analysis is human which has its attitudes to the economic 
phenomenon of scarcity.  Naturally, Islamic economics can 
make its how assumptions about its unit of analysis.  They 
may even define a Homo Islamicus who abides by Shari'ah 
in his or her economic behavior.  They may also continue 
to use mathematics and statistics for developing and 
testing theories, without ignoring that the claim of 
economics being a positive science is just a mirage.  
HOW TO FILL THE GAPS 
Gaps like these must be filled through the correction of our 
understanding, the reorientation of our analysis, and the 
straightening of our applications.  This requires extra 
efforts from Shari'ah specialists, economists, finance 
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specialists and practitioners. It is my sincere belief that 
Islamic finance, when properly perceived and correctly 
applied will produce a new economic order that benefits 
humanity. It therefore deserves proper perception and 
correct application. 
The responsibility for filling the gaps in the field of Islamic 
economics lies squarely on economists’ shoulders. 
Currently, and after the first generation of Islamic 
economists, we need a second generation that has a strong 
command of the tools of analysis as well as a good 
understanding of Fiqh Al-Muamalat.   
The second generation must start with learning the 
contributions of the first generation and build upon them 
in order to present further contributions. 
The last step requires a selective approach to research 
topics. The new generation must avoid topics which are too 
general or concern some limited applications.   
Articles regarding environment, sustainable growth and 
other topics in economic development usually have very 
little added value.  Other non-analytical articles about 
Zakah and Awqaf should also be shunned away. 
Some of the possible solutions are: 
First, we need to provide more scholarships to economics 
students to write PhD dissertations in Islamic economics. 
The scholarship must include paying for studying Shari'ah 
in the area of Maqassid, policies and Muamalat. 
Second, it is about time to publish and distribute some of 
the contributions of the first generation.  For example, the 
author’s article entitled: towards a monetary and financial 
system for an interest-free economy deserves attention.  
None of the younger generation has shown familiarity with 
it nor built upon it any further analysis.  The article has 
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seen further extensions by the author which have not been 
published yet. 
Third, appointment of some members of the first generation 
as professors to teach their own thought and perceptions of 
Islamic economics to graduate students would help is 
passing the flag to the next generation. 
Fourth, we must provide assistance to the countries of the 
Arab Spring, which desire to introduce Islamic finance, in 
order to enable them to build up a credible applied model 
and put it to practice gradually. This will eventually provide 
theoreticians with real-life experiments. 
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